Descartes
In the First Meditation, Descartes said that ‘reason now teaches [him] that [he] should be just as careful about withholding assent from uncertain, doubtful things as from patent falsehoods, [and] the least bit of doubt on any point will suffice for complete rejection.’[i] He thinks that insofar as the tiniest doubt can be raised about something, then one does not really know it and that in order to know that something is true, one must be absolutely certain that it is true.
In questioning his beliefs hitherto, Descartes first applied skepticism to his sensory perception. He believes that since we cannot ascertain the reliability of our sensory perceptions, we cannot assign any degree of trust to information that our senses furnish us with about the external world. If we take the Socratic definition of knowledge as ‘justified, true belief’ then according to the Cartesian view in First Meditation, a person would be unjustified in his beliefs that ripe strawberries are red because there can be doubts raised with regards to the limitations and reliability of his visual faculty.[ii] This is akin to how animals like dogs see the world in a monochromatic scheme while we see it in spectra of colours. While we may be inclined to think that the world is coloured in the particular way as we see it, we do not actually know if it is indeed coloured as such, just as how animals may have imperfect knowledge of colours (assuming that the world is indeed multi-coloured). It is also uncertain as to whether within humans, we really have the often assumed and unspoken consensus on ideas about colours. For those who are labeled ‘colour-blind’, their perception of colours is very different from that of the mainstream, and if such deviations can be found, does it perhaps indicate that our visual knowledge of the external world is therefore tampered with incoherence and maybe, gross inaccuracies? The same can also be said of the other four senses through which we gather knowledge about the external world and similar doubts can also be cast on knowledge derived through them.
In a later attempt to convince himself of seemingly irrefutable knowledge about his own corporeal existence and things immediate to him, such as a paper in his hands, Descartes sank deeper into the skeptic’s mire. He then went on to question his very consciousness and the ascertainability of the external world in general. Through his argument by skeptical hypothesis, or more commonly, the Dream Argument, Descartes demolished even knowledge of basic, intuitive things like that of his own name, the days of the week and whether he has hands. In his skeptical hypothesis, he posits that he may be dreaming and establishes in the first premise that he cannot prove that he is not dreaming. He then asserts in the second premise that if he cannot prove he is not dreaming then he does not even have knowledge of ordinary things. His conclusion is therefore as follows: since he cannot prove that he is not dreaming, he does not even have knowledge of ordinary things.[iii] Or more simply, it means that if we cannot prove that we are in a matrix, then can we really claim that we know anything about the world? Since all that we think we know may be just purely cognitive stimulations that do not actually exist in or correspond with reality. For example, I think I know that a strawberry is made up of cells from biology classes, but can I be certain that they are not deceptive green binary codes masquerading as observable cells? If I cannot, can I then proudly proclaim that I know what a strawberry is? According to Descartes, I cannot; I do not know what a strawberry is.
Hence, one of the key complications that arise from Descartes’ thesis is whether knowledge can be defined in such strict, unassailable, absolute terms i.e. of not having a single element of doubt. Does ‘justified, true belief’ characterise knowledge or must knowledge be ‘certain, true belief’? Is it sufficient for the belief to be ‘true’ in our immediate, observable environment or must it be ‘true’ also in the larger, external world (e.g. the world outside the matrix) of which existence we might have no idea about, ever? Should we define knowledge as something which is attainable then, or, is it acceptable that we define it as an idealised concept that entails perfect perspicacity of the relations in this world, even if going by such definition, there can then be no morsel of knowledge which can be gleaned from reality? Is knowledge something functional which affords us practical utility in ‘our world’ or is it reasonable to assume that true knowledge does not have to serve any, practical purpose other than to inform? Thus, the question really is whether knowledge has a correct definition at all. Unfortunately, all these questions about what constitute the selection criteria for a definition and understanding of knowledge have no objective, indubitable answer; it is largely a matter of individual preference and subjective perspective. There can be no authority or conclusion on a matter like this for even if we accept that knowledge is as what Plato suggests, that is ‘justified, true belief’, it is still up to the individual to negotiate a parameter within which he or she is willing to accept a ‘belief’ as being justified. And ‘justified’ to Descartes would translate to imply ‘indubitability’, but to a scientist would probably suffice to mean ‘observability, measurability, repeatability and intersubjectivity’.[iv] As such, this paper shall not pretend that it has the correct or best definition of knowledge but shall argue instead from a subjective standpoint that knowledge be defined in less absolute and arbitrary terms than Descartes chose and be contingent upon further discoveries about the true nature of our existence. The paper shall attempt to advance this position by questioning the validity of Descartes’ second premise in his Dream Argument, thus the soundness of the conclusion which he arrives at and proposing knowledge be seen in multiple perspectives.
Descartes’ second premise suggests that if we cannot prove that we are not dreaming then we cannot even have basic knowledge of ordinary things like having hands. Yet, while it may be possible that the hands are not actually present before us in flesh and blood as we thought and are perhaps figments of our imagination in dreamland, it is nonetheless undeniable that we do have knowledge of their ‘appearances’. And it is the apparent consistency of such ‘appearances’ in our world that we should be concerned about, for it seems that knowledge can also be viewed from this appearance-reality dichotomy. Let us perform a small thought experiment. Imagine that as we walk down a park, a ball roll to our feet. As we ponder upon the philosophical implications of whether the ball exists or does not exist, we have already used the label of a ‘ball’ to describe the phenomenon of a certain round object that is created for the purpose of playing, and used this notion to help us philosophise. Hence, whether it be a ball in the sense that we think we know it to be or a ball that is woven from our fertile imagination, it is nevertheless undeniable that our mind is able to intimate some vague ‘knowledge’ of the ball through its very presentation, signal or ‘appearance’ as a ball. And although we do not know it in “reality” i.e. its truest form, we do know its appearance. Thus, it should follow that we do have knowledge of the ball, even though this knowledge is not perfect. For even if the external world which we think we live in is artificial, created, it is nevertheless possible that as agents of perception in the Dream, i.e. the false world, we are able to create a corpus of knowledge based on how things appear to us. If we can accept this, we can then accept that we have some knowledge about the Dream in which we inhabit, ordinary things like a ball and some indirect knowledge of the Real World, which our Dream might be part of.
Similarly, if it appears to us that every time we reach out our hands to pick up the ball and the ball is picked up, then this ‘apparent interaction’ between the ‘ball’ and us can also be said to contribute to our knowledge about how things appear to work in our Dream. Considering the fact that such ‘apparent relations’ may withstand the tests of useful tools such as repeatability and observability in our Dream, and consequently afford us real, practical utility with regards to maneuvering in the Dream, it is therefore possible and reasonable that such ‘apparent relations’ and ‘appearances’ contribute to a kind of ‘Functional Knowledge’. This Functional Knowledge serves an immediate, practical purpose to us in our Dream while the ‘real relations’ and ‘reality’ that are not immediately knowable to us in our Dream seems to contribute to a kind of ‘Philosophical Knowledge’ that serves a “higher”, grander purpose.[v] Such Philosophical Knowledge is fundamental to the true knowledge of our external world which includes both the Dream and the Real World, if indeed there is such a Real World. Such Philosophical Knowledge is important because if there is a Real World outside our Dream, then, in order for us to have the truest, highest grade of knowledge about the ‘world’ we inhabit, then we would actually need to understand our Dream in relation to the Real World just as Descartes proposed. But if there is no Real World other than the Dream, then, the implication is that we would still be able to use this Philosophical Knowledge to understand the Dream as it is.
So far, the arguments presented assume that we do not know if we are in a Dream or in the Real World, and seeks to propose that regardless of whether we are in the former or latter, we can still know about both through ‘appearances’ and ‘apparent relations’. Now, the paper will attempt to substantiate its proposition that knowledge ought to be viewed on the aforementioned functional-philosophical continuum. The chief reason for issuing this normative view of knowledge is because one recognises that although true knowledge seems to connote a perfectly perspicacious understanding of the world but one also recognises at the same time that intuitively people do feel that they know something even though they do not really know what they know. As such, this continuum is proposed to hopefully recouncile the two extremes and accord intrinsic value to both. By suggesting that both kinds of knowledge are possible, the paper hopes to preserve both definitions i.e. that knowledge can contain some elements of uncertainty and knowledge must be indubitable.
To illustrate how this co-existence might be possible, we shall imagine the scenario whereby we are indeed in a Dream. However, what we do not know is whether our predicament is a temporal or permanent one. We are also uncertain about the true nature of the Real World, and whether the Dream and the Real World are two distinct entities or overlapping ones. However, what we do know is that Philosophical Knowledge concerning the true nature of the Real World is something that if known, can potentially translate into Functional Knowledge that is of immediate use and impact to us in our Dream. An example would be how if our predicament is a temporal one i.e. we realise at the end of the day that we do live in a Matrix-like world and people are no more than streaming green digits. This new Philosophical Knowledge can then transform our pre-existing Functional Knowledge which had enabled us to relate to people in a particular way e.g. before I know that I am in a matrix, I would console someone if I see him ‘apparently’ crying. However, with my new Philosophical Knowledge, I might then decide not to do so because it would seem ridiculous to want to console streaming, green digits. On the other hand, should our Dream be a perpetual one, it is then fortunate that we did not cling onto a particular, strict, self-defeating definition of knowledge that would have rendered us ignorant and defenseless in the Dream. By granting that there can be two kinds of knowledge that is neither superior nor inferior to each other, it enables us to preserve the most accessible form of knowledge in the Dream and prevents us from concluding counter-intuitively that we do not even know the most basic, ordinary things. Because it is not possible to know if we can ever prove or find out whether we are in a Dream, it also means that we might be able to do so! Thus, it is best that we grant equal weightage to both so that if we ever succeed in doing so, then our contingent Functional Knowledge gleaned in the Dream can be combined with the true Philosophical Knowledge to give us a perfect knowledge about ourselves, our relations with the world and the world. And if we find out otherwise – that there is no Real World, or realised that we simply cannot ever know if we are in a Dream, then at least we have not spent this time in vain, lamenting about how we would never know if we ever know. But we have instead apply ourselves to processing the Functional Knowledge and in so doing, fortuitously stumble upon true knowledge or some knowledge.
If indubitable knowledge is an idealism and reliable knowledge, realism, then, we should have our feet lodged firm in the ground of realism and our hands outstretched for loftier goals.
To-do List this Holidays!
Franz Kafka, The Trial
Albert Camus, Myth of Sissyphus
Albert Camus, The Stranger
Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment
Vicotr Hugo, Les Miserables
James Joyce, Ulysses
Roger Scruton, History of Modern Philosophy
Jimmy Carter, Palestinan Peace not Apartheid
Romance of the Three Kingdom
Edward Albee, Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf
Benedict Anderson, The Imagined Community
Isaiah Berlin, Political Ideas in the Romantic Age
Hannah Arendt, Promise of Politics
Paul Roberts, The End of Food
Carl Jung, Essays on Contemporary Events – The Psychology of Nazism
Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene
Run.
There have been many who think that running is a stupid activity, a boring flurry of cycling legs. Most of the time I agree, and this is especially so when I try to be honest with myself. Nevertheless, as with every thing that man does, I think along the way I invent meaning for this past-time. I begin to see running as a reflection of something deeper than a moronic aerobic exercise. I begin to convince myself that it embodies discipline and has its own unique philosophy. (If you’re interested in my idiosyncratic imagination, you may read on.)
I like running because it always takes one from a locale to another (barring those who prefer lab-rat style running on treadmill). And this, is not what many other sports can offer. For one, when I swim, I like to imagine myself as a leaping dolphin in the Pacific ocean, but nevertheless, that is more likely the cherished delusion of a bored-stiff goldfish that is swimming to and fro in a tiled-tank. Running is nothing like that. Running makes the scenery around you reel back slowly like gigantic wallpapers, and if the environment is unstirring, you would be that only lively, prancing figure caught on a still-frame. Somehow, there is a certain gaiety in being such a lively feature on someone’s visual landscape.
Running is an exhilarating escape. In a long stride, you are no longer bounded to a locus. In that split second, you have traversed a minute segment of space-time. Running embodies an initiative. In that, action is sometimes better than non-action. If contemplation is a reflection of wisdom, then action may be a dramatic depiction of a will. When you run, you either have a goal or you have a nightmare behind you. In either case, to run, is a demonstration of Man’s freewill, his ability to abandon and his ability to pursue.
The running courses are sometimes like life’s challenges. And I always believe that when I know how to run, I know how to live my life. There were some runs that were so bad that I would give up after five minutes and allow myself to stop at every red light, and in those times, I find that I throw in the towel with the same rapidity as with all other endeavours in life. There are other runs where I feel that if I push harder, I would get my body to go beyond its limits and in those runs, I am always surprised by how much I have left when I thought I didn’t have anything anymore. It’s always surprising what one can find out about oneself in an innocuous run. It’s like what those NS guys say about NS. When you are driven to extreme tedium and exhaustion, you just drop all pretences and be yourself. And since you run alone, you alone will judge.
I like the big gulps of air that come along with running, hardly anything makes me feel more alive than that. The greater the exertion, the deeper the satisfaction. The harder one lives, the more alive one is.
Once a cub, always a cub.
Sometimes, it’s hard to believe it when people think that animals do not have souls. They do, and they’re beautiful.
From this point on
I’m standing at a juncture whereby I am considering the path to take in the next 2.5 years. The choice between the study of business and politics is really difficult to make. Having done a minor in business I almost know instinctively that the study of shareholder wealth maximisation does not get me high on cloud nine. It is like an insulated world of numbers and models. It reminds me of the days that I would do fascinating math sums together with Lei in multiple Mcdonalds. There is a comforting formula to every valuation and there are always limited assumptions behind every formula. Doing finance is my intellectual vanity at its max, the desire to conquer something that the brightest minds in school excel in. I like the business school because it represents competition, and I get excited at the prospect of struggling with and conquering something. Also, I don’t like to feel that my baby knows so much about something that I have no clue about. 
My heart is probably with politics because I can understand people and interests more intuitively than I can understand cold hard numbers. I like to read about how institutions constrain agency and how society struggle to negotiate with the state. Because politics concern important fluctuations in sentiments that would affect the polity and an acute interplay of interests which is fascinating to watch, I sometimes feed off the drama. But that would be putting it too cynically, perhaps more fundamentally, I really care. Reading about how systems can exploit people and the interests of the rich, powerful and numerous can subjugate those of the poor, disadvantaged and small, convince me that there is a point in engaging society. Given my temperament, I would very much prefer something like philosophy, which germinates in safety and abstraction.
At times, I get somewhat upset by my fickle heart. I’ve gone from interest to interest, plotting such an eclectic education path that I have problem explaining my choices to prospective employer. Sometimes, I think I should just be a housewife because that affords me the MOST time to do EVERYTHING I want but I know I will wither away without challenges. I hope I get out of this confusion soon. Time is running out.
