My Complaints

Reading philosophy is like examining life’s futility sometimes. I really like cartesian doubts but when I get to parts like I think therefore I am, I start wondering how Descartes can suddenly believe that ’I’ must be in existence beyond doubt; can’t it be computer stimulated too? Similarly, I get very excited when I read about Camus’ analysis of how life is absurd because we are constantly searching for answers that are almost impossible to be obtained satisfactorily. But it’s disappointing to realise that no god, no science, no phenomenology can explain this hopeless conundrum. Camus exhortations to be constantly aware of this absurdity and to persistently revolt against it are at best tragically heroic. Plato says that Man’s body of knowledge is like a tree, the trunk of which is physics and the roots of which is metaphysics; at times, we find that we’re a little rootless. Up till now, we still cannot prove conclusively that God exist/ do not exist and whether there is mind/body duality.

Descartes

In the First Meditation, Descartes said that ‘reason now teaches [him] that [he] should be just as careful about withholding assent from uncertain, doubtful things as from patent falsehoods, [and] the least bit of doubt on any point will suffice for complete rejection.’[i] He thinks that insofar as the tiniest doubt can be raised about something, then one does not really know it and that in order to know that something is true, one must be absolutely certain that it is true.

 

In questioning his beliefs hitherto, Descartes first applied skepticism to his sensory perception. He believes that since we cannot ascertain the reliability of our sensory perceptions, we cannot assign any degree of trust to information that our senses furnish us with about the external world. If we take the Socratic definition of knowledge as ‘justified, true belief’ then according to the Cartesian view in First Meditation, a person would be unjustified in his beliefs that ripe strawberries are red because there can be doubts raised with regards to the limitations and reliability of his visual faculty.[ii] This is akin to how animals like dogs see the world in a monochromatic scheme while we see it in spectra of colours. While we may be inclined to think that the world is coloured in the particular way as we see it, we do not actually know if it is indeed coloured as such, just as how animals may have imperfect knowledge of colours (assuming that the world is indeed multi-coloured). It is also uncertain as to whether within humans, we really have the often assumed and unspoken consensus on ideas about colours. For those who are labeled ‘colour-blind’, their perception of colours is very different from that of the mainstream, and if such deviations can be found, does it perhaps indicate that our visual knowledge of the external world is therefore tampered with incoherence and maybe, gross inaccuracies? The same can also be said of the other four senses through which we gather knowledge about the external world and similar doubts can also be cast on knowledge derived through them.

 

In a later attempt to convince himself of seemingly irrefutable knowledge about his own corporeal existence and things immediate to him, such as a paper in his hands, Descartes sank deeper into the skeptic’s mire. He then went on to question his very consciousness and the ascertainability of the external world in general. Through his argument by skeptical hypothesis, or more commonly, the Dream Argument, Descartes demolished even knowledge of basic, intuitive things like that of his own name, the days of the week and whether he has hands. In his skeptical hypothesis, he posits that he may be dreaming and establishes in the first premise that he cannot prove that he is not dreaming. He then asserts in the second premise that if he cannot prove he is not dreaming then he does not even have knowledge of ordinary things. His conclusion is therefore as follows: since he cannot prove that he is not dreaming, he does not even have knowledge of ordinary things.[iii] Or more simply, it means that if we cannot prove that we are in a matrix, then can we really claim that we know anything about the world? Since all that we think we know may be just purely cognitive stimulations that do not actually exist in or correspond with reality. For example, I think I know that a strawberry is made up of cells from biology classes, but can I be certain that they are not deceptive green binary codes masquerading as observable cells? If I cannot, can I then proudly proclaim that I know what a strawberry is? According to Descartes, I cannot; I do not know what a strawberry is.

 

Hence, one of the key complications that arise from Descartes’ thesis is whether knowledge can be defined in such strict, unassailable, absolute terms i.e. of not having a single element of doubt. Does ‘justified, true belief’ characterise knowledge or must knowledge be ‘certain, true belief’? Is it sufficient for the belief to be ‘true’ in our immediate, observable environment or must it be ‘true’ also in the larger, external world (e.g. the world outside the matrix) of which existence we might have no idea about, ever? Should we define knowledge as something which is attainable then, or, is it acceptable that we define it as an idealised concept that entails perfect perspicacity of the relations in this world, even if going by such definition, there can then be no morsel of knowledge which can be gleaned from reality? Is knowledge something functional which affords us practical utility in ‘our world’ or is it reasonable to assume that true knowledge does not have to serve any, practical purpose other than to inform? Thus, the question really is whether knowledge has a correct definition at all.  Unfortunately, all these questions about what constitute the selection criteria for a definition and understanding of knowledge have no objective, indubitable answer; it is largely a matter of individual preference and subjective perspective. There can be no authority or conclusion on a matter like this for even if we accept that knowledge is as what Plato suggests, that is ‘justified, true belief’, it is still up to the individual to negotiate a parameter within which he or she is willing to accept a ‘belief’ as being justified. And ‘justified’ to Descartes would translate to imply ‘indubitability’, but to a scientist would probably suffice to mean ‘observability, measurability, repeatability and intersubjectivity’.[iv] As such, this paper shall not pretend that it has the correct or best definition of knowledge but shall argue instead from a subjective standpoint that knowledge be defined in less absolute and arbitrary terms than Descartes chose and be contingent upon further discoveries about the true nature of our existence. The paper shall attempt to advance this position by questioning the validity of Descartes’ second premise in his Dream Argument, thus the soundness of the conclusion which he arrives at and proposing knowledge be seen in multiple perspectives.

 

Descartes’ second premise suggests that if we cannot prove that we are not dreaming then we cannot even have basic knowledge of ordinary things like having hands. Yet, while it may be possible that the hands are not actually present before us in flesh and blood as we thought and are perhaps figments of our imagination in dreamland, it is nonetheless undeniable that we do have knowledge of their ‘appearances’. And it is the apparent consistency of such ‘appearances’ in our world that we should be concerned about, for it seems that knowledge can also be viewed from this appearance-reality dichotomy. Let us perform a small thought experiment. Imagine that as we walk down a park, a ball roll to our feet. As we ponder upon the philosophical implications of whether the ball exists or does not exist, we have already used the label of a ‘ball’ to describe the phenomenon of a certain round object that is created for the purpose of playing, and used this notion to help us philosophise. Hence, whether it be a ball in the sense that we think we know it to be or a ball that is woven from our fertile imagination, it is nevertheless undeniable that our mind is able to intimate some vague ‘knowledge’ of the ball through its very presentation, signal or ‘appearance’ as a ball. And although we do not know it in “reality” i.e. its truest form, we do know its appearance. Thus, it should follow that we do have knowledge of the ball, even though this knowledge is not perfect. For even if the external world which we think we live in is artificial, created, it is nevertheless possible that as agents of perception in the Dream, i.e. the false world, we are able to create a corpus of knowledge based on how things appear to us. If we can accept this, we can then accept that we have some knowledge about the Dream in which we inhabit, ordinary things like a ball and some indirect knowledge of the Real World, which our Dream might be part of.

 

Similarly, if it appears to us that every time we reach out our hands to pick up the ball and the ball is picked up, then this ‘apparent interaction’ between the ‘ball’ and us can also be said to contribute to our knowledge about how things appear to work in our Dream. Considering the fact that such ‘apparent relations’ may withstand the tests of useful tools such as repeatability and observability in our Dream, and consequently afford us real, practical utility with regards to maneuvering in the Dream, it is therefore possible and reasonable that such ‘apparent relations’ and ‘appearances’ contribute to a kind of ‘Functional Knowledge’. This Functional Knowledge serves an immediate, practical purpose to us in our Dream while the ‘real relations’ and ‘reality’ that are not immediately knowable to us in our Dream seems to contribute to a kind of ‘Philosophical Knowledge’ that serves a “higher”, grander purpose.[v] Such Philosophical Knowledge is fundamental to the true knowledge of our external world which includes both the Dream and the Real World, if indeed there is such a Real World. Such Philosophical Knowledge is important because if  there is a Real World outside our Dream, then, in order for us to have the truest, highest grade of knowledge about the ‘world’ we inhabit, then we would actually need to understand our Dream in relation to the Real World just as Descartes proposed. But if there is no Real World other than the Dream, then, the implication is that we would still be able to use this Philosophical Knowledge to understand the Dream as it is.

 

So far, the arguments presented assume that we do not know if we are in a Dream or in the Real World, and seeks to propose that regardless of whether we are in the former or latter, we can still know about both through ‘appearances’ and ‘apparent relations’. Now, the paper will attempt to substantiate its proposition that knowledge ought to be viewed on the aforementioned functional-philosophical continuum. The chief reason for issuing this normative view of knowledge is because one recognises that although true knowledge seems to connote a perfectly perspicacious understanding of the world but one also recognises at the same time that intuitively people do feel that they know something even though they do not really know what they know. As such, this continuum is proposed to hopefully recouncile the two extremes and accord intrinsic value to both. By suggesting that both kinds of knowledge are possible, the paper hopes to preserve both definitions i.e. that knowledge can contain some elements of uncertainty and knowledge must be indubitable.

 

To illustrate how this co-existence might be possible, we shall imagine the scenario whereby we are indeed in a Dream. However, what we do not know is whether our predicament is a temporal or permanent one. We are also uncertain about the true nature of the Real World, and whether the Dream and the Real World are two distinct entities or overlapping ones. However, what we do know is that Philosophical Knowledge concerning the true nature of the Real World is something that if known, can potentially translate into Functional Knowledge that is of immediate use and impact to us in our Dream. An example would be how if our predicament is a temporal one i.e. we realise at the end of the day that we do live in a Matrix-like world and people are no more than streaming green digits. This new Philosophical Knowledge can then transform our pre-existing Functional Knowledge which had enabled us to relate to people in a particular way e.g. before I know that I am in a matrix, I would console someone if I see him ‘apparently’ crying. However, with my new Philosophical Knowledge, I might then decide not to do so because it would seem ridiculous to want to console streaming, green digits. On the other hand, should our Dream be a perpetual one, it is then fortunate that we did not cling onto a particular, strict, self-defeating definition of knowledge that would have rendered us ignorant and defenseless in the Dream. By granting that there can be two kinds of knowledge that is neither superior nor inferior to each other, it enables us to preserve the most accessible form of knowledge in the Dream and prevents us from concluding counter-intuitively that we do not even know the most basic, ordinary things. Because it is not possible to know if we can ever prove or find out whether we are in a Dream, it also means that we might be able to do so! Thus, it is best that we grant equal weightage to both so that if we ever succeed in doing so, then our contingent Functional Knowledge gleaned in the Dream can be combined with the true Philosophical Knowledge to give us a perfect knowledge about ourselves, our relations with the world and the world. And if we find out otherwise – that there is no Real World, or realised that we simply cannot ever know if we are in a Dream, then at least we have not spent this time in vain, lamenting about how we would never know if we ever know. But we have instead apply ourselves to processing the Functional Knowledge and in so doing, fortuitously stumble upon true knowledge or some knowledge.

If indubitable knowledge is an idealism and reliable knowledge, realism, then, we should have our feet lodged firm in the ground of realism and our hands outstretched for loftier goals.

淡泊明志，宁静致远

“淡泊明志，宁静致远”是诸葛亮54岁时写给他8岁儿子诸葛瞻的《诫子书》。

 诸葛草庐中门联：淡泊以明志 宁静而致远。此联出自第37回二顾草庐中。刘、关、张三人跟童子进诸葛草庐，至中门，刘备见门上大书一联。其大意是：不追求名利，生活简单朴素，才能显示出自己的志趣；不追求热闹，心境安宁清静，才能达到远大目标。通过此联揭示了诸葛亮的高尚德操。

    诸葛亮的《诫子书》中也有这样两句话： 

   “夫君子之行，静以修身，俭以养德。非淡泊无以明志，非宁静无以致远。夫学须静也，才须学也，非学无以广才，非志无以成学。淫慢则不能励精，险躁则不能治性。年与时驰，意与日去，遂成枯落，多不接世，悲守穷庐，将复何及！” 

    译文：有道德修养的人，是这样进行修养锻炼的，他们以静思反省来使自己尽善尽美，以俭朴节约财物来培养自己高尚的品德。不清心寡欲就不能使自己的志向明确坚定，不安定清静就不能实现远大理想而长期刻苦学习。要学得真知必须使身心在宁静中研究探讨，人们的才能是从不断的学习中积累起来的；如果不下苦工学习就 不能增长与发扬自己的才干；如果没有坚定不移的意志就不能使学业成功。纵欲放荡、消极怠慢就不能勉励心志使精神振作；冒险草率、急燥不安就不能陶治性情使节操高尚。如果年华与岁月虚度，志愿时日消磨，最终就会像枯枝落叶般一天天衰老下去。这样的人不会为社会所用而有益于社会，只有悲伤地困守在自己的穷家破舍里，到那时再悔也来不及了。
 
   “非淡泊无以明志，非宁静无以致远。”这既是诸葛亮一生经历的总结，更是对他儿子的要求。在这里诸葛亮用的是“双重否定”的句式，以强烈而委婉的语气表现了他对儿子的教诲与无限的期望。用现代话来说：“不把眼前的名利看得轻淡就不会有明确的志向，不能平静安详全神贯注的学习，就不能实现远大的目标”。通过上述分析，我们可以看出诸葛亮运用了《逻辑学》中的“否定之否定规律”来强调他要表达的“淡泊以明志，宁静而志远”。这是一句富含哲理的话。这同“要想取之，必先与之”，“欲达目的，需先迂回曲折”的道理一样，现在的“淡泊”、“宁静”求清净，不想有什么作为，而是要通过学习“明志”，树立远大的志向，待时机成熟就可以“致远”，轰轰烈烈干一番事业。“淡泊”是一种古老的道家思想，《老子》就曾说“恬淡为上，胜而不美”。后世一直继承赞赏这种“心神恬适”的意境，如白居易在《问秋光》一诗中，“身心转恬泰，烟景弥淡泊”。他反映了作者心无杂念，凝神安适，不限于眼前得失的那种长远而宽阔的境界。
 
     其实，“淡泊明志，宁静致远”，这句话的最早出处是西汉初年刘安的《淮南子?主术训》。其中语云：“是故非澹薄无以明志，非宁静无以致远，非宽大无以兼覆，非慈厚无以怀众，非平正无以制断。”刘安(约公元前179—公元前122年)是汉高祖刘邦之孙。《淮南子》是由刘安与其门客共同撰写的一部规模宏大、内容丰富的哲学和政治学巨著，全书的哲学、政治思想，最近乎老、庄，同时也融进了孔子、墨子、韩非子的思想。

    比刘安晚出生300多年的诸葛亮，躬耕苦读，兼收并蓄，摄取了包括《淮南子》在内的历代各个学派的营养。“非淡泊无以明志，非宁静无以致远”，就是诸葛亮汲取了《淮南子?主术训》中的精粹，并在此基础上将其充实、拓展、完善，直至他临终前，作为《诫子书》写给了他的儿子诸葛瞻，以警醒诸葛氏后人。

　　通读《诫子书》，我们可以发现，诸葛亮是对《淮南子?主术训》中精华的借鉴、传承与弘扬，而不是简单地摘录与复制。这本身就启示我们，当我们今天解读、运用。“淡泊明志，宁静致远”的时候，既要尊重它的历史原意，也要结合时代特征，赋予它新的内涵。

　　诸葛亮的一生，可以分为前后两个27年。前27年，是他博览群书、修身养性、静观天下、立志用世的准备阶段；而后27年，是他身体力行、完善自我、鞠躬尽瘁、死而后已的奉献阶段。我们也可以说，前27年是他的“淡泊”“宁静”阶段，后27年则是他的“明志”“致远”阶段。诸葛亮一生中借鉴前人的思想很多，但他为何对“淡泊明志，宁静致远”情有独钟呢？在诸葛亮短暂的一生中，出山之后，日理万机，所以著述不多。《三国志》本传中载有《诸葛氏集目录》，共24篇，104112 字，而“淡泊明志，宁静致远”作为引用语，却贯穿了他的一生，最后作为遗训，划上了他人生的圆满句号。

　 “淡泊明志，宁静致远”，虽只寥寥八字，却被诸葛亮钟爱一生，而且作为他的精神的集中体现，其影响力远远超过其原创《淮南子》。“淡泊明志，宁静致远”所体现的思想是博大精深的，它的精髓至少能从哲理性、真理性和进取性诸方面凸现出来。

　　哲理性。“淡泊明志，宁静致远”是一句富含哲理的话。孔子曾说：“士志于道，而耻恶衣恶食者，未足与议也。”老子也明示：“五色令人目盲，五音令人耳聋……”它同欲取之必先予之、欲达目的需先迂回曲折的道理一样。现在的“淡泊”“宁静”，不是不想有什么作为，而是要通过学习“明志”，树立远大的志向，待时机成熟就可以“致远”，轰轰烈烈地干一番事业。这就是老子《道德经》中所倡导的，“无为”的结果是“无不为”，他言“宁静”实则“制动”，他甘“居后”实则“占先”。有人认为“淡泊明志，宁静致远”说的似乎只是“文化界”和“读书人”的事，其实不然。哲理的境界是最高境界，它所阐述的道理是带有普遍性的。

　　真理性。有人认为，“淡泊明志，宁静致远”离我们太遥远了，缺乏时代感。其原因是，他们还没有真正悟出“淡泊明志，宁静致远”当中所蕴含的真理性。中国历史上许多思想家曾有许多名言，如孔子的“学而不思则罔，思而不学则殆”，孟子的“天将降大任于斯人也，必先苦其心志，劳其筋骨，饿其体肤，空乏其身，行拂乱其所为，所以动心忍性，增益其所不能”，荀子的“不积跬步，无以至千里；不积小流，无以成江海”等，历经千年仍有着强大的生命力。所谓真理，是正确反映客观世界及其规律的认识。毛泽东说：“判定认识或理论之是否真理，不是依主观上觉得如何而定，而是依客观上社会实践的结果如何而定。”由此，我们考察古今中外，凡成功者，莫不遵循了这一真理法则；凡失败者，莫不违背了这一真理法则。尽管真理有“绝对真理”与“相对真理”之分，但经过千余年检验的“淡泊明志，宁静致远”，证明了它是真理。所以，它也是没有时限的。

　　进取性。“淡泊”不是弃世，“宁静”也不是慵懒。倘若只是一味孤高自许，却没有植根现实的理想，也不过是消极的逃避现实。倘若只是一味封闭自守，懒于交流，更是愚人的做法。“淡泊明志”，志在修身，进而济世；“宁静致远”，因达于天下而远，因泽于后世而远。“淡泊”与“宁静”并非空洞的华丽辞藻，并非书生的自命不凡，它需要真正高尚而淳朴、丰富而博爱的心灵。“淡泊”与“宁静”，是以“明志”与“致远”为终极理想目标的，是积极向上、催人奋进的。古人说过的话，是无法更改的，“淡泊明志，宁静致远”这八个字，我们今天也不能更改它，如同当年诸葛亮给“淡泊明志，宁静致远”注入了新的内涵一样。今天，我们同样可以赋予它新的时代内涵，使其具有新的活力，新的生命力。

　　当年，诸葛亮汲取了“淡泊明志，宁静致远”的养分，同时也把这份宝贵的遗产留给了我们。

David Orr – Slow Knowledge

What is fast knowledge?

The culture of fast knowledge rests on these assumptions:

• Only that which can be measured is true knowledge
• The more knowledge we have, the better
• Knowledge that lends itself to use is superior to that which is merely contemplative
• The scale of effects of applied knowledge is unimportant
• There are no significant distinctions between information and knowledge
• Wisdom is an undefinable, hence unimportant, category
• There are no limits to our ability to assimilate growing mountains of information, and none to our ability to separate essential knowledge from that which is trivial or even dangerous
• We will be able to retrieve the right bit of knowledge at the right time and fit it into its proper social, ecological, ethical, and economic context
• We will not forget old knowledge, but if we do, the new will be better than the old
• Whatever mistakes and blunders occur along the way can be rectified by yet more knowledge
• The level of human ingenuity will remain high
• The acquisition of knowledge carries with it no obligation to see that it is responsibly used
• The generation of knowledge can be separated from its application
• The generation of knowledge is general in nature, not specific to or limited by particular places, times, and circumstances

What is slow knowledge?

The worldview inherent in slow knowledge rests on these beliefs:

• Wisdom, not cleverness, is the proper aim of all true learning
• The velocity of knowledge can be inversely related to the acquisition of wisdom
• The careless application of knowledge can destroy the conditions that permit knowledge of any kind to flourish (a nuclear war, for example, made possible by the study of physics, would be detrimental to the further study of physics)
• What ails us has less to do with the lack of knowledge but with too much irrelevant knowledge and the difficulty of assimilation, retrieval, and application as well as the lack of compassion and good judgment
• The rising volume of knowledge cannot compensate for a rising volume of errors caused by malfeasance and stupidity generated in large part by inappropriate knowledge
• The good character of knowledge creators is not irrelevant to the truth they intend to advance and its wider effects
• Human ignorance is not an entirely solvable problem; it is, rather, an inescapable part of the human condition

Imagine a world guided by slow knowledge. How will slow knowledge change the conditions for science and technology? How will slow knowledge change the way we perceive space and time? And what about slow development?

What is Truth?

Do not believe in anything simply because you have heard it. Do not believe in anything simply because it is spoken and rumoured by many. Do not believe in anything simply because it is found written in your religious books. Do not believe in anything merely on the authority of your teachers and elders. Do not believe in traditions because they have been handed down for many generations. But after observation and analysis, when you find that anything agrees with reason and is conducive to the good and benefit of one and all, then accept it and live up to it. — Buddha

‘then accept it and live up to it’ This is such an uncompromising exhortation. The abhorrence for hypocrisy in knowledge and action has never been captured more succintly and impactfully than in these few words. So well-said.

Lock Nietzsche up!

I am surprised by the coincidence of finding Nietzsche amidst my current flow of thoughts about life. It was seredipitous. Wandering down the lanes of bookshelves in PageOne, and looking desperately for a copy of “The Book of Quietude” by my newfound favourite writer, I heard two friends coming across Nietzsche. The conversation went like this:

A: “Oh Nietzsche, him and his talk about how God is dead”

Laughter ensues.

B: “Well, maybe God is really dead, who knows?”

More laughter ensues.

On a normal day, I would probably dismiss it as a random comment and go about my own business, but that night I had this overflowing sense of academic righteousness that was bursting at my heart. And thus, I thought instead, “What do these people know about Nietzsche. I really hate people who just throw ideas around when they might not even have a basic understanding of these ideas. But oh well, what do I know about Nietzsche to even bother? Perhaps he was not even deserving of mention, controversial as he is with all his trouble-making aphorism.” To save me from my own critical scrutiny, I picked up a book on Nietzsche and packed it along with me. Better be educated now than never.

After poring through it, I realised that he was really mistaken. Just because he had a book titled ‘Gay Science’, people assumed that he was a homosexual. Just because he said God is dead, people assume him to be an atheist apologist (as a matter of fact he issued that statement because he could not accept the way that Christianity issues what he calls a ’slave morality’, a morality that values meekness, suffering, weakness, sacrifice and pain) People dismisses his work because he descended into madness in his later years, when his earlier works did exhibit exemplary lucidity, organisation and brilliance.

Nietzsche advocates denouncing religion or any so-called moral code that subjugates the individual. He believes that the individual has long been suppressed by the herd mentality and he should free himself to achieve the ideals of an uberman. He used a thought experiment to parallel the Christian version of afterlife - if you were to live through your life repeatedly, how would you choose to live your life. He challenges his readers to focus on finding out all about oneself and emphasise that this self-knowledge is much more important than any other knowledge. I thought that this was a pretty neat idea because sometimes, people think they understand a lot about the world, how it functions and how people think but eventually they are not too certain about who they are. It is a journey, knowing oneself.

 He also broached the topic of knowledge and I like the way he de-emphasised science and advocates a more well-balanced approach. He also warns of science becoming the new religion and that scientist using their much lauded ‘objectivity and empirism’ will hoodwink the masses and make believe that science was a really objective way of measuring Truth. I love this paragraph of his from ‘The Gay Science’ where he points out that although scientists can better describe things, they cannot really explain things better.

‘Assuming that one estimated the value of a piece of music according to how much of it could be counted, calculated, and expressed in formulas: how absurd would such a ’scientific’ estimation of music be! What would one have comprehended, understood, grasped of it? Nothing, really nothing of what is ‘music’. He asks, ‘ Do we really want to permit existence to be degrade to this – reduced to a mere exercise for a calculator and an indoor diversion for mathematics? This knowledge is ‘human, all too human”

Way cool. =)

Inverted Pascal’s Wager

I should really be doing my journal but I cannot withstand the allure of idling on wordpress. Religion would aptly be the theme of last week’s life. Ever since I knew Immanuel, there has been more and more discussions surrounding Christianity. Sometimes I really dread these debates because I think that they cannot be systemised or fully explored. All the evidences thrown from both sides are rather useless because there is not a significant clash. Nowadays, I’m more receptive to one good point kind of presentation e.g. a new refreshing perspective at this age-old question. I realised that I might die an agnostic at the rate of my questioning and believing. The Pascal’s Wager, inverted, could be interpreted as such – I would rather not believe, so that if there’s is no God I will not feel stupid but if there was I knew that I couldn’t have chosen him due to the imperfect information.

Derrida’s Deconstruction

At its core, if it can be said to have one, deconstruction is an attempt to open a text (literary, philosophical, or otherwise) to several meanings and interpretations. Its method is usually based on binary oppositions within a text — for example inside and outside or subject and object, or male and female. ‘Deconstruction’ then argues that such oppositions are culturally and historically defined, even reliant upon one another, and seeks to demonstrate that they are not as clear-cut or as stable as it would at first seem. On the basis that the two opposed concepts are fluid, this ambiguity is used to show that the text’s meaning is fluid as well.

This fluidity stands against a legacy of traditional metaphysics (that is, Platonist thought) founded on oppositions, that seeks to establish a stability of meaning through conceptual absolutes where one term, for example “good,” is elevated to a status that designates its opposite, in this case “evil,” as its perversion, lack or inferior. These “violent hierarchies,” as Derrida termed them, are taken as structurally unstable within the texts themselves, where the meaning strictly depends on this contradiction or antinomy.

Derrida insisted that deconstruction was never performed or executed but “took place” through “memory work”: in this way, the task of the “deconstructor” was to show where this oppositional or dialectical stability was ultimately subverted by the text’s internal logic. Meticulous readings find philosophy anew. The result of this renewal is often to find striking interpretations of texts. No “meaning” is stable: Derrida called the “metaphysics of presence” the thing that keeps the sense of unity within a text; where presence was granted the privilege of truth.

To understand this argument, one may need to explore Derrida’s deconstruction of the speech/writing opposition, of which Of Grammatology is perhaps the clearest study. Derrida’s critique of oppositions may be partly inspired by Nietzsche’s genealogical reconsideration of “good” and “evil” (see, in particular, Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals).

Derrida’s practice of reading raises the question of the relationship between deconstruction and literary theory. Within literary studies, deconstruction is often treated as a particular method of reading — in contrast to Derrida’s claims that deconstruction is an “event” within a text, not a method of reading it. Despite this apparent contradiction, the literary sensibilities of Derrida cannot be ignored, as many of his deconstructions were of poems and literary texts.

Further, deconstruction’s sensitivities to philosophical efforts at defining limits have been taken by some to imply a deconstructive agenda for the ultimate reversal of order. This agenda would cover: philosophy’s claim to be the first of all academic disciplines; holding out hopes of uniting all; delineating what is proper to each as they remain apart; and expelling from itself non-philosophy (via judgements which irreducibly take part in violence and hinge on matters of interpretation made through language). This has been seen as the privilege of the non-serious and the literary over a humbled philosophy.

Although its influence on literary studies is probably the most well-known and well-reported effect of deconstruction, its roots are more philosophical than literary, although it is also tied to distinct but abutting academic disciplines such as linguistics, women’s studies, and anthropolgy. Derrida’s examination of the latter’s philosophical foundations, both conceptual and historical, and their continued reliance on philosophical argument (whether consciously or not), was an important aspect of his thought.

This relationship with the Heideggerean term was chosen over the Nietzschean term “demolition”, as Derrida shared with Heidegger an interest in renovating philosophy to allow it to treat increasingly fundamental matters.